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This thesis examines rescissions and deferrals of budget authority made by
Presidents Carter and Reagan from 1977 through 1988. Trends in the use of
rescissions and deferrals are analyzed to determine the purpose of and the exent to
which the President uses impoundment to control the pace of spending.
The data collected for this period indicated that impoundment was used to
influence policy more often than was intended by Congress. The President used
impoundment to influence federal spending for more specific reasons. These
include the use of impoundment to alter his predecessor's budget to establish
different spending priorities and to maintain spending priorities when faced with
reduced partisan political support in Congress. The President appears to have
inflated the budget submission for fiscal year 1985, and then impounded that budget
at increased levels upon re-election. Impoundment recommendations of national
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. IMPOUNDMENT-THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS
Presidential impoundment of appropriated funds is a tool, given the executive
by Congress, to manage the pace of spending. The authority to impound funds was
granted to the President in the Antideficiency Act. An impoundment reduces the
amount of budget authority available to a department or agency for use on a
particular program or project. This results in fewer dollars being spent than were
appropriated by Congress. Impoundment exists because the executive branch, as it
executes government programs, is in the unique position of being able to routinely
effect efficiencies and savings in the spending process. Congress, as a political
body, operates much more slowly than the executive branch, and cannot possibly
rule on the numerous potential savings created during the day-to-day operations of
the federal government. Therefore, Congress has delegated to the President the
authority to spend fewer dollars than were appropriated, as long as the intent of the
appropriation is fulfilled.
Conflicts arise between the President and Congress when the executive branch
does not carry out the policy objectives of the legislative branch. Congress sees as
its constitutionally appointed duty the function of "overseer" of public monies. It
fulfills this role via the appropriations process, which is the principle vehicle for
Congress to set national policy. The President, as chief executive, apparently
believes his policies, as identified via the President's budget, constitute the best
course of action to be followed in administration of the federal government. These
conflicts occur during the struggle between the executive and legislative branches to
formulate national policy priorities. Congress accuses the President of using
impoundment of appropriated funds to circumvent congressional policy objectives,
while the President claims impoundment is simply a tool to provide a more efficient
government.
The impoundment process is more complicated than it appears on the surface.
There is a great body of literature available from studies done to better understand
the effects of presidential impoundment on the budget process and policy
formulation within the executive and legislative branches of government. ^ Within
this literature two conflicting theories are present. Briefly, the first theory
describes the use of presidential impoundment as primarily routine in nature with
the interest of government efficiency the primary goal of executive departments and
agencies. An opposing view is that presidential impoundments are primarily policy
in nature, with the enhancement of presidential policy objectives, sometimes at the
expense of congressional ones, the principle goal.
^Among the most valuable sources on this topic are Louis Fisher, "Impoundment
Of Funds: Uses and Abuses" Buffalo Law Review, 23 (1973) : 141-199; Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr, "The Imperial Presidency" pp. 235-245, (Boston, Mass.: Houghton
Mifflin Co, 1973); Louis Fisher, "Presidential Spending Power" pp. 147-201,
(Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1975); James P. Pfiffner,
"The President, The Budget, And Congress: Impoundment and the 1974 Budget
Act" pp. 27-44, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979); Allen Schick,
"Congress And Money" pp. 401-411, (Washington DC: The Urban Institute, 1980);
Louis Fisher "Effect Of The Budget Act on Agency Operations" in Rudolph G.
Penner, ed., The Congressional Budget Process After Five Years pp. 149-173,
(Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1981); Louis Fisher, "Ten Years
Of The Budget Act: Still Searching for Controls" Public Budgeting & Finance, 5
(1985) : 24-26; Howard E. Shuman, "Politics And The Budget: The Struggle
Between the President and the Congress" 2nd ed. pp. 184-214, (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988).
B. SIGNinCANCE AND LIMITATIONS
Understanding what Presidential impoundment of appropriated funds is and
how it has been used is important to all who are involved in the budget process.
Budget formulation strategies include an analysis of the many variables that come
together to influence the size of the appropriation and the apportionment that is
ultimately spent on the program or project. Impoundment is one of the important
variables to be evaluated. Consideration of how it may be used is critical to
executive and legislative decisionmakers throughout the budget process.
This thesis examines 192 impoundments made by Presidents Carter and Reagan
from fiscal year 1977 through 1988. The primary focus is on defense
impoundments, since the size and shape of defense spending is a principle area of
disagreement between the President and Congress. Impoundments of Department
of Housing and Urban Development programs were selected for analysis to provide
contrast with the national defense impoundments. The purpose of the analysis is to
determine if and to what extent the President used impoundment to manage the pace
of spending.
Analysis of the data was limited by the method the President used to justify the
impoundment recommendations in the special messages sent to Congress.
Frequently, these justifications were so general as to be almost valueless in
determining whether the impoundment was for purposes of efficiency or policy.
The aggregation of reductions of many projects into one impoundment made
regionalizing impossible in many cases.
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter II describes the federal budget process and the history of
impoundment. Changes to the impoundment process caused by The Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 are discussed. The model used in the
study is presented.
Chapter III presents the analysis of the data. Possible reasons for the use of
presidential impoundment are discussed.
Chapter IV is a summary of the study. Conclusions and recommendations for
further research are presented.
D. THESIS QUESTIONS
This thesis explores impoundment recommendations made by two Presidents
over a 12 year period from fiscal year 1977 through 1988 to determine if
presidential impoundments are primarily routine or policy in nature.
Impoundments examined will be primarily those involving the Department of
Defense. However, Department of Housing and Urban Development
impoundments will be examined to provide contrast.
Additionally, this thesis will explore the following questions.
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Has impoundment been used to alter the predecessor's budget?
2. How has impoundment affected election year budget submissions?
3. How have changes in partisan political support in Congress affected the use of
presidential impoundment?
4. Are impoundments of national defense appropriations regionally distributed?
5. To what extent has Ronald Reagan, a pro-defense President, impounded
national defense programs?
The following chapter will review how the budget process establishes the
relationship between executive and legislative policy formulation, and how the
budget process can be affected by presidential impoundment, as well as provide an
understanding of the impoundment process. The thesis model is then described and
compared to a model developed by James J. Gosling for use in a study of the use of
the line item veto by Wisconsin Governors from 1975 through 1985.
II. BACKGROUND
Presidential impoundment of funds appropriated by Congress has a long and
diverse history. The issue of impounding appropriated funds is at best a cloudy one,
where Congress may support presidential impoundment on the one hand, and
vehemently opposing it on the other. Fisher, observing this dichotomy, states that:
some actions are legitimate exercises of executive power, while others trespass
directly on the legislative domain. To say that "impoundment has been used in
the past" is to say nothing at all. The proper inquiry must be "What kind of
impoundment?" It comes in many shapes and colors, legitimate in one case and
highly suspect in another. As an omnibus term, "impoundment" tells us very
little. [Ref. l:p. 142]
What are the different types of impoundment that can bring such diverse
reactions from Congress? Before addressing these, an understanding of the
budgetary process is necessary to help focus on the apparent causes of congressional
reaction to presidential impoundment.
A. THE BUDGET PROCESS
The budget process of the federal government has two major parts: formulation
and execution. Budget formulation involves budget planning and draft-budget
submission, discussion, compromise, and decisionmaking by the parties involved,
while budget execution involves the process of using appropriated funds to
execute the programs of government. The initial step in understanding the
budget process involves recognition of the purpose of the federal budget. Bureau of
the Budget (BOB) director Robert Mayo testified before the Joint Economic
Committee on June 12th, 1969:
Allocating limited resources among alternative uses is the very essence of
budgeting. In federal budgeting there are two levels of resource allocation and
priority determination: first, between the private and the public sectors;
second, within the public sector.
A detailed evaluation of programs guides us in the recommendations that
the executive branch makes to the Congress for the federal sector. The final
allocations are, of course, the responsibility of the executive branch and the
Congress acting in concert. These allocations within the federal sector reflect
political, economic, and social decisions, and therefore, measure our national
priorities. [Ref. 2:pp. 63-64]
Brundage [Ref. 2:pp. 65-75] provides a sequence of stages in the budget
formulation process. The process begins with the issuance of budget guidelines by
the Office of Management and Budget (0MB), formerly the Bureau of the Budget,
to provide depanments and agencies with suggestions for the preparation of new
budget requests. After the guidelines have been reviewed by the department or
agency, a preliminary budget is submitted to 0MB. The figures included in each
agency budget are accumulated and the President is briefed on the compilation by
0MB. Changes may be made in the guidelines, and the preparation of the detailed
budget requests is resumed. Discussions between the department or agency and
0MB follow, resulting in a formal budget request submission to 0MB.
The budget requests are then thoroughly analyzed by the 0MB staff. Hearings
are held between each department or agency and 0MB in which the agency head is
allowed to state the case for his budget request. After the department and agency
presentations, the 0MB staff reviews the budget requests with consideration given
to the information received during the hearings.
The budget requests are then adjusted by 0MB to keep them in line with the
President's spending priorities. Natchez and Bupp refer to this adjustment as
"budget mark-up", where 0MB reviews each budget, item by item, program by
program, cutting away where it can, accepting other requests as submitted, and
occasionally, adding money to some project the administration looks upon with
special favor.
...it is at this point that the standing of the department's chief administrator is
determined. It is he who must go before the President and argue for funds that
are presumably vital to his department's functions. Consequently, the degree
of success that he has with the President is widely regarded as an evaluation of
his administrative worth and, at the same time, a measure of the importance
that agency or department has in the administration. [Ref. 3:p. 953]
The department and agency budget requests, as amended or restored, are
organized into the President's annual budget document and, combined with the
Budget Message, is presented to Congress.
Congress funds the budget in a three step bicameral process. The House and
Senate Budget Committees, armed with the President's budget, hold hearings to
gain additional information and to learn the views of their colleagues. The purpose
is to draft their versions of the First Resolution. Differences between the House
and Senate versions must be resolved in conference. The First Resolution is to be
completed and passed by April 15th.
Wildavsky [Ref. 4:p. 147] describes the First resolution as being much like the
President's budget. It resembles the President's budget in being only a
recommendation, something to which action will be compared. The First Resolution
provides guidance to the authorizing and appropriating committees. After its
passage. Congress proceeds with the business of authorizing and appropriating
funds.
Armed with the First Resolution, substantive committees go about the process
of authorizing the President's budget. The authorizing committees have the first
opportunity to alter the President's budget, and thereby, introduce their own
version of what the national policy objectives should be. Hearings are held and
differences between House and Senate versions are worked out in conference
committee. Thirteen separate authorization bills are passed by Congress and sent to
the President for signature.
The appropriations committees duplicate the process in jurisdictional
subcommittees, where the second major opportunity to alter the budget for
policy reasons arises. The work of the subcommittees is combined and sent to the
floor of each chamber. Debate on the floor can result in more changes to the
appropriations. Differences between the Senate and House versions are resolved in
a conference committee. Finally, the legislation is passed as the Omnibus
appropriations bill, or the thirteen individual bills, and is sent to the President.
When this legislation is signed the budget formulation process is complete and the
execution process begins upon arrival of the new fiscal year.
The budget execution process begins when departments and agencies request
apportionment of appropriated funds from 0MB. The amount apportioned (by
calendar quarter) is dependent on the amount appropriated by Congress as well as
seasonal considerations required by the Antideficiency Act of 1906 as amended.
The purpose of this act is to preclude deficiency appropriations. It is significant
because, prior to being modified by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974, it provided the President with the principle legal authority to
impound appropriated funds under certain circumstances. Part of the Act states:
No officer or employee of the United States shall make or authorize an
expenditure from or create or authorize an obligation under any
appropriation or fund in excess of the amount available therein; nor shall any
such officer or employee involve the government in any contract or other
obligation, for the payment of money for any purpose, in advance of
appropriations made for such purpose, unless such contract or obligation is
authorized by law.. .In apportioning any appropriation, reserves may be
established to provide for contingencies, or to effect savings whenever savings
are made possible by or through changes in requirements, greater efficiency
of operations, or other developments subsequent to the date on which such
appropriation was made available. Whenever it is determined by an officer
...to make apportionments and reapportionments that any amount so reserved
will not be required to carry out the purposes of the appropriation concerned,
he shall recommend the rescission of such amount.... [Ref. 5]
This Act provides the executive with the authority to impound appropriated
funds to effect savings and provide for contingencies during the daily
administration of the government. It requires the President to submit rescission
recommendations when appropriated funds are not needed to carry out the
objectives of the appropriation.
B. IMPOUNDMENT fflSTORY
Even before the Antideficiency Act was passed, the President had used
impoundment as a tool for managerial efficiency. President Jefferson impounded
appropriated funds for gunboat construction and maintenance in 1803. When
Jefferson notified Congress that the funds would remain unexpended, he explained
that the favorable turn of affairs on the Mississippi rendered the expenditure
unnecessary. The Louisiana Purchase had apparently reduced tension in the area
which reduced the immediate need for the gunboats. Neither Jefferson nor
Congress saw a reason to spend the money. Therefore, Congress did not challenge
the President on the issue of presidential authority to impound appropriated funds.
[Ref 6:p. 150]
The Antideficiency Act delegates to the President the authority to impound
funds to effect savings or to establish reserves for contingencies. Fisher [Ref. 1 :p.
142] points out that, for purposes of efficiency, the President also uses
impoundment to accommodate changing events which make an expenditure
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unnecessary, as well as to satisfy basic managerial responsibilities. In 1950 the
House Committee on Appropriations emphasized that economy neither begins or
ends in the halls of Congress. According to the Committee, an appropriation of a
given amount for a particular activity constituted:
only a ceiling upon the amount which should be expended for that activity.
The administrative officials responsible for administration of an activity for
which appropriation is made bear the final burden for rendering all necessary
service with the smallest amount possible within the ceiling figure fixed by
Congress. [Ref. I:pp.l43-144]
A second type of impoundment involves statutory authority, where Congress
legally provides the President authority to impound funds. This type of
impoundment power has typically been given on a one time or emergency basis.
Fisher points out that Congress has granted statutory authority for impoundment
during times of crisis, such as the "Great Depression" and during war time [Ref.
6:p. 162]. Pfiffner agrees and adds that Congress sometimes grants statutory
authority to impound funds when Congress cannot agree on a course of action. The
House and Senate were hopelessly divided on the issue of Air Force procurement of
aircraft in 1950. They passed the decision to the President. [Ref. 7:pp. 35-36]
Wildavsky also supports this view and states that Congress might want the President
to do what was necessary when it was not politic for congressmen to do so [Ref. 4:p.
135]. Thus, impounding based on tacit consent was an informal safety valve for
keeping spending under control.
Impoundment for purposes of managerial efficiency or by statutory authority
have been largely without conflict between the President and Congress. Policy
impoundments, on the other hand, tread on the constitutional prerogative of
Congress. Such impoundments appear to be the major source of trouble between the
executive and legislative branches of the federal government with respect to the
establishment of spending priorities. Schlesinger [Ref. 8:pp. 238-239] points out
that up until the Nixon administration, the President was able to use impoundment
because he had sufficient support in Congress to do so. Previous administrations
had not used impoundment as a means of terminating or curtailing programs
without congressional support. Impoundments were for routine financial
management with few exceptions.
For Nixon, impoundment had become not an instrument of economy but of
policy. Convinced that the electorate was behind him in determination to hold
down nondefense spending, persuaded that Congress was incapable of keeping
public spending under control, exhilarated by the margin of his re-election in
1972, he saw the Presidency as the judge of last resort. Impoundment now
became what Franklin Roosevelt had said thirty years before it should not be—
a substitute for the item veto... whatever the merits of the item veto, the
Constitution authorized the President to veto only entire bills. The item veto
was simply not a legal power of the Presidency. [Ref. 8:p. 239]
The Nixon theory of impoundment appears to have been a central attack on the
role of Congress in the political process. After all, implied in the Constitution is the
provision that Congress indicates policy priorities through the control of
appropriations. "Congress, the 58th Federalist had said, held the purse; and this
power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual
weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the
people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect
every just and salutary measure." [Ref. 8:p. 240]
While previous administrations had kept congressional leadership informed
with respect to impoundment, Nixon apparently did not. Schlesinger points out that
the practice of keeping Congress informed was no guarantee of support for the
impoundment, but because Nixon did not bother to assert a claim or make an
argument, congressional support for presidential policy impoundments was
reduced. Nixon simply acted, or had his subordinates act, until these actions
produced effective resistance within Congress. [Ref. 8:p. 241]
The ability of Congress to challenge Nixon's policy impoundments on a
permanent basis was hindered by the lack of a sound congressional budget process.
Over the years Congress had lost considerable control over the budgetary process.
Shuman points out that not only was the budget out of control as measured by debt,
deficits, and stagflation, but congressional procedures were unwieldy, inadequate,
diffused, and antiquated. [Ref. 9:p. 189] Schlesinger agrees and emphasizes that
many leaders in Congress believed any anti-impoundment legislation would have to
be accompanied by evidence of congressional self-control in spending. Congress
initiated budget reform by establishing the Joint Study Committee. This committee
held hearings and submitted a report that later formed the basis for Title one
through nine of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974
(which is referred to as "The Congressional Budget Act"). [Ref. 8:p. 399]
Bipartisan opposition to Nixon policy impoundments ran strong in Congress.
In hearings before the Subcommittee on the Judiciary, while working on anti-
impoundment legislation (S. 373), Senator Ervin draws the distinction between
impoundments for purposes of managerial efficiency and those involving matters of
policy:
...Reserving of appropriated funds, that is, not spending an entire
appropriation, is not a new concept, and when undertaken in a lawful manner it
may be quite useful in effecting economy. Various procedures have been used
over the years, the most common being the reserving of funds to prevent
deficiencies in a Federal program, or to effect savings in accordance with the
Antideficiency Act. Freezing of funds have occurred when Congress, for
some special reason such as war or economic uncertainty, passes
appropriations as nothing more than ceilings for expenditures, leaving it to the
executive branch to expend part or all of the funds at its discretion. Moreover,
freezing may occur as the result of a specific congressional mandate. Under
any of these forms of impoundment, the executive branch is permitted, or
required, to withhold funds under certain specified conditions.
Unfortunately, impoundment often occurs under circumstances where the
executive branch, for reasons of its own, desires to avoid expending funds
which the Congress explicitly directed to be spent for some particular purpose.
It is this situation which poses a threat to our system of government and which
so patently violates the separation-of-powers doctrine. [Ref 10:p. 5]
Senator Ervin goes on to condemn those impoundments that subordinate the policies
of Congress. His views are supported by Senator Javits who compares Nixon's
impoundments to the line item veto and argues that the issue of impoundment of
appropriated funds is a "battle between Congress and the President":
...The problem is how to share between the President and Congress the awful
powers of making war and spending money. We have heard a lot about the
power of Congress, but we are deprived of the power of the Congress when
the line item veto is employed under the guise of impoundment, and that is
exacdy what is happening...we are engaged in a historic struggle basically
relating to the fundamental nature of representative government. We are
carrying it on as to the making of war, and now we are carrying it on as to the
making of appropriations, and I believe this is in the interest of our Nation's
future and the constitutional balance of the three elements of our Government.
[Ref 10:pp. 22-26]
The House of Representatives worked out their own version of anti-
impoundment legislation during hearings held by the Committee on Rules in 1973.
The recommendations became H.R. 8480. This bill was merged with the Senate
version, S. 383, and, along with recommendations made during formal legislative
hearings on the bills, became Title Ten or the "Impoundment Control Act"
provisions of the 1974 Act. [Ref 9:p. 190]
Title Ten establishes procedures for congressional review and control of
executive actions that prevent or delay the expenditure of funds appropriated by
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Congress. Impoundment controls are predicated on a distinction between
rescissions and deferrals, with different procedures applied to each category. When
the President does not anticipate any current or prospective need for the funds, or
when withheld funds would lapse before they are scheduled for release, he must ask
Congress to rescind the appropriation. Deferrals are to be proposed when the
President anticipates future but not current need for the funds. The President
must notify Congress of all proposed rescissions and deferrals. He must also
provide certain required information concerning each action.
In the case of rescissions, the funds must be released, that is apportioned, unless
Congress passes a rescission bill within 45 days of continuous session following
notification by the President. Wildavsky indicates that by requiring positive action
in both houses, the more serious policy change, rescission, is made unlikely [Ref.
4:p. 143]. Deferrals, as the law was written, however, may continue in effect unless
either the House or the Senate disapproves them by an impoundment resolution.
This latter control, the one-house legislative veto, is now invalid as a result of the
Supreme Court's decision in INS v. Chadha (1983). But Congress has begun to
disapprove deferrals by placing specific disapproval language in the regular or
supplemental appropriations bills. Since this type of disapproval is included in a bill
sent to the President for signature, it is permissible under the Court's test. [Ref.
ll:p. 24]
Deferral cannot extend beyond the end of the fiscal year. The Comptroller
General of the United States is responsible for overseeing executive compliance
with the impoundment controls. He must inform Congress if the President has
failed to report an impoundment or if an action has been improperly classified. The
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Comptroller General also is empowered to bring suit to enforce the impoundment
controls. [Ref. 12:p. 190]
The Impoundment Control Act has not put an end to impoundments; more than
$180 Billion in rescissions and deferrals were submitted to Congress between 1975
and 1987. Nor has the act ended all controversy over impoundments, although the
passions have abated and the constitutional crisis appears to be over. Impoundment
control has settled into a three stage process involving presidential
recommendations and reports, Comptroller General review, and congressional
action, or, in most cases, inaction.
Currently, impoundment recommendations fall loosely into two types: routine
and policy. Statutory impoundments no longer hold much significance because
changes to the budget process, brought about by the Congressional Budget Act, have
nearly eliminated them. A routine impoundment occurs when a program or project
can be completed without full use of available funds or when funds cannot be used
until a later date. A policy impoundment occurs when the President decides that he
does not want the program or project, or wants it on a smaller scale than that
authorized by Congress. [Ref. 12:pp. 402-403]
C. GOSLING MODEL
Gosling [Ref. 13:pp. 292-299] developed a model to test the extent to which use
of the line item veto by Wisconsin governors involved an attempt to subordinate
legislative policymaking. The study focuses on the 542 item vetoes exercised by
Wisconsin governors between 1975 and 1985, where the item veto affected the
receipt or budgeted expenditure of state funds. Item veto information was
ascertained from state records of the Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau. Table 1
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shows the attributes that were evaluated in the Gosling model and identifies those
which are applicable to the thesis.
TABLE 1
CATEGORIES USED FOR EVALUATION
Gosling Model
L The Purpose of the Item Veto/Impoundment
a. Of budgetary concern
b. To correct technical errors in budget preparation
c. Of public policy concern
d. Of political concern
e. To preserve established Gubernatorial
or executive branch prerogatives
f. Of concern about legality
2. The Partisan Political Environment
a. The political party of the Governor
b. The poUtical party holding a majority
of seats in the State Senate
c. The majority party's percentage of
seats in the State Senate
d. The political party holding a majority
of seats in the State assembly
e. The majority party's percentage of
seats in the State Assembly
3. The Characteristics of the Item Vetoed/Impounded
a. The nature of the veto

















c. Whether the veto affects local government Does not apply
d. The institution contributing the item veto Does not apply
e. Whether the veto restored the Governor's Does not apply
budget recommendation
f. Whether the veto restored the Joint Does not apply
Legislative Committee on Finance version
g. The cumulative fiscal effect of all vetoes Does not apply
of state revenues and budgeted expenditures
for each biennial budget session
The categories Gosling used to evaluate the attributes of the individual line item
vetoes were selected to specifically determine the basis of the justification for the
veto. Some of the justifications include: judgements of what the state could afford to
spend, whether the veto prevented excessive government intrusion, and if the veto
prevented inappropriate political advantage. [Ref. 13:pp. 294-295] The thesis
model evaluates the attributes of impoundment more generally. These evaluations
consist of categorizing impoundments for the purposes of efficiency, policy, or to
comply with statutory provisions.
Gosling evaluated the partisan political environment and its affect on the
likelihood of conflict between the Governor and the legislature over the executive
budget and legislature's version of the spending bill [Ref 13:p. 295]. The thesis
model uses partisan political support changes to determine if the President increases
policy impoundments to maintain spending priorities when faced with reduced
partisan political support in Congress.
Gosling characterizes the item vetoes to determine the fiscal effect, if any, of
each item veto. Wisconsin state law allows the Governor to alter wording within
the law, or to line through a particular budget number, but not to lower or to
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raise it. Therefore, to include those item vetoes that do not involve cost or
budgetary impact, the Gosling model must categorize them using the set of
characteristics listed in Table 1. Because cost or budgetary impact is consistently
present in impoundment actions, characterization does not apply to the study of
presidential impoundment.




(HI ) The line item veto has been used primarily as a tool of fiscal restraint.
2. (H2) The line item veto has been used primarily as a tool of policymaking.
3. (H3) The line item veto has been used primarily as a tool of partisan politics.
The individual item vetoes are reviewed and categorized, against a biennial
timetable, to determine the extent to which the above mentioned hypotheses are
accurate. [Ref 13:pp. 292-295]
Gosling concluded that the line item veto was not used primarily as a tool of
fiscal restraint. Only 14 percent of the line item vetoes directly affected
appropriations. He found that the Hne item veto had been used in Wisconsin more as
a tool of policy than as one of fiscal restraint. Of the many justifications supporting
recommended vetoes, 59.5 percent involved policy considerations, whereas only
17.7 percent involved concern over cost or budgetary impact. On the partisanship
issue, item vetoes were likely to override the legislative policy ten percent more
often when the Governor's political party did not hold a majority of seats in the
legislature. [Ref 13:pp. 295-297]
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D. THESIS MODEL
The thesis model is an adaptation of the Gosling model, using impoundment
recommendation information obtained from 0MB to test the following hypotheses:
1. (HI) Impoundment has been used primarily as a tool of routine managerial
efficiency.
2. (H2) Impoundment has been used primarily as a tool to alter congressional
policymaking.
The individual impoundments are categorized to determine the extent to which
they are for the purposes of efficiency, policy, or to comply with statutory
provisions. Specific information about the impoundment is reviewed to determine
which category is appropriate. Key to this determination is the review of the
justification for impoundment provided by the President in the special message sent
to Congress.
This study is similar to the Gosling study in that it attempts to classify actions of
the executive as he deals politically with matters of fiscal importance between the
executive and legislative branches of government. The nature of the testing in both
studies involves the review of archival data to determine the extent that these actions
have been for the purposes of efficiency or policymaking and if partisan politics
played a significant role.
One significant difference between the studies involves the relationship to
budgetary process phase. The line item veto is used during the budget formulation
stage, while impoundment occurs during the budget execution phase in the
budgetary process.
E. BACKGROUND SUMMARY
After review of the federal budget process, it is apparent the Congress carefully
guards its constitutional prerogative to control the federal purse. Control of the
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appropriations process is the principle vehicle used by Congress to inject its
prioritized policy objectives into the operations of government. The President,
according to Congress, is more interested in his policy objectives and, therefore, is
likely to circumvent the wishes of Congress in the execution of his office.
In the following chapter, historical data on impoundment recommendations,
made by Presidents Carter and Reagan, of Department of Defense (DoD) and
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), is presented. By analyzing
these impoundments, it may be easier to see how the appropriations process is
affected by these recommendations.
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m. DATA ANALYSIS
A. DEFENSE IMPOUNDMENTS AND PRESIDENT REAGAN
President Reagan has doubled the defense budget, in current dollar terms, in his
eight years in the White House. The defense budget has grown more than 49
percent, in constant dollars, since 1980. He has clearly been a pro-defense President
with respect to the defense budget. Therefore, it might be surprising to learn that
President Reagan has impounded defense appropriations at all.
In his eight years as President, he has made 89 impoundment recommendations
totalling $7.4 billion. He has not attempted to cancel much defense spending;
rescissions recommended during his two terms total $336.5 million. Most of the
Reagan impoundment recommendations have been deferrals, totalling $7.1 billion.
Many of these deferrals have been designed to stretch out defense spending, mostly
in military construction and Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy accounts. When
the national defense budget began to decrease, in constant dollar terms. President
Reagan limited his impoundment recommendations almost exclusively to
managerial efficiency actions.
President Reagan made impoundment recommendations of national defense
programs for many of the same reasons as his predecessors. Several of these
reasons are detailed in this thesis. Some may find it striking that he made any
impoundment recommendations of national defense programs. The data indicates
that impoundment control is a tool to help the President manage his federal budget
priorities, pro-defense or not.
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B. METHODOLOGY
To test the thesis h>potheses:
1. (HI) Impoundment has been used primarily as a tool of routine managerial
efficiency.
2. (H2) Impoundment has been used primarily as a tool to alter congressional
policymaking.
Data was analyzed on rescission and deferral recommendations of national
defense and Housing and Urban Development programs made by the President from
fiscal year 1977 through 1988. These programs were selected because they include
projects supported by different constituencies. National defense is supported by
more conservative interests, while HUD programs are supported by those less
conservative.
Data for the study was obtained primarily from an archival review of the
special messages submitted by the Office of Management and Budget, at the
direction of the President. The special messages are printed in the Federal Register
as required by the Impoundment Control Act.
Each special message contains a justification section where the President
describes the purpose of the rescission or deferral. Review of these justifications
provide information used to determine if the rescission or deferral recommendation
is made for purposes of efficiency or policy.
An example of a rescission recommendation justification made for the purpose
of affecting policy is Rescission R-82-1:
Justification: The Congress appropriated 1981 funds for advance procurement
of 180 F- 16 aircraft in 1982. This rescission proposal of $65.7 million would
support procurement of 120 F-16 aircraft in 1982, as requested by the
Administration. [Ref 14:p. 54263]
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In this example, Congress had previously approved the purchase of 180 F- 16
aircraft during 1982. The President apparently made a policy decision to reduce F-
16 procurement to 120 aircraft in 1982. This is a clear example of presidential use
of rescission for the purpose of altering congressional policymaking.
An example of a rescission recommendation justification made for purposes of
efficiency is Rescission R-77-10:
Justification: Funds provided to the Other Procurement, Air Force account
have been used to terminate the Advanced Logistics System (ALS). The
Department of Defense has determined-after the settlement of contracts for
the termination of the ALS--that there is $14.4 million remaining which it
does not plan to obhgate. Since there is no intention to obligate these funds and
they will lapse under present plans, they are being proposed for rescission.
The House Appropriations Committee, in House Report (94-5) (pages 163-
165), concurs in the view that any funds which remain after termination costs
have been met should be permitted to lapse. [Ref 15:p. 4352]
It is clear the $14.4 million is not needed to terminate this program. Therefore, it is
appropriate to rescind this budget authority.
An example of a deferral recommendation justification made for the purpose of
affecting policy is Deferral D-80-51:
Justification: This deferral of $1 million would allow for the consistent
transition from FY 1980 to the amended FY 1981 program as currently
proposed. This deferral applies to the Interim Waste Operations program, and
is part of the Administration's effort to combat inflation by reducing-where
feasible—lower priority programs in 1980 and is complementary to the effort
to balance the 1981 Budget. [Ref 16:p. 27696]
In this example. President Carter attempted to push 1980 spending into 1981,
thereby reducing outlays in 1980. Congress had decided this program was
necessary in 1980 and appropriated the funds. This deferral does not involve
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efficiency savings, rather, it involves an attempt to manage the deficit through
deferral.
An example of a deferral recommendation justification made for the purpose of
efficiency is Deferral D-83-23:
Justification: The amounts in the listed five-year appropriations are currently
deferred under provisions of the Antideficiency Act (31 U.S.C. 665) which
authorize the establishment of reserves for contingencies. These funds are
deferred due to administrative delays, such as project designs not being
completed and incomplete coordination of projects with either other federal
agencies or local government agencies. Funds will be apportioned for
individual projects throughout the year upon completion of project design and
or coordination. [Ref 17 :p. 55620]
This is an example of the President recommending deferral to set aside reserves for
contingencies, one of the congressionally approved uses of impoundment.
In all, 132 rescissions or deferrals of national defense programs and 60
rescissions or deferrals of HUD programs were reviewed and categorized in this
manner.
C. EFHCIENCY OR POLICY?
Congress separated impoundment into two distinct types, rescission or deferral,
when it passed the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.
Rescission was to be used to cancel unnecessary budget authority and deferral was to
be used to delay spending until it could be done more efficiently. Fisher suggests
that rescission was the principle impoundment action the President would use to
substitute executive spending priorities for those enacted by Congress. The deferral
mechanism would be used primarily for efficiency impoundments. [Ref 18: pp.
149-154]
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Table 2 shows the distribution of rescissions and deferrals for national defense
and HUD programs from fiscal year 1977 through 1988. Special message
justifications were reviewed and the various rescissions and deferrals were
categorized as either policy or efficiency. The statutory deferrals of HUD
programs are included for continuity, but, as discussed in chapter two, have litde
usefulness in the analysis. The distribution of impoundments in Table 2 support the
idea that rescission is more likely to be used for policy reasons. However, deferral
does not appear to be used primarily for purposes of efficiency. Deferrals of these
two programs were made for policy reasons 44 percent of the time. This indicates
that the clear difference between rescission and deferral, as intended by Congress,
does not necessarily exist in practice. Therefore, since it is reasonable to lump
rescission and deferral together, and refer to them as impoundment, this will be
assumed for the majority of the analysis. Additionally, a more detailed examination
of the data can be made by considering the programs separately, in two year
increments, and including an analysis of the relative dollar values of the
impoundments.
Congress passed Title Ten of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974, anticipating that the practice of policy impoundments on the
part of the President would be greatly reduced. During floor action on the
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Senator Ervin, as floor manager, said he
expected that there would be no more than "a few dozen policy impoundment
actions a year." [Ref. 19: p. 11238]
However, the President has apparently been unwilling to limit impoundment to
issues of managerial efficiency. Table 3 shows the distribution of Department of
Defense, military and civil, and Department of Energy defense related
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impoundments during the period of study. Impoundment data is presented in an
annual format, in both numerical and dollar value terms, having been categorized in
the initial analysis. Percentages for each element are determined by dividing the
efficiency and policy impoundment values for each two year segment by the sum of
the two. A review of these impoundment recommendations demonstrate the extent
to which the President attempted to alter congressional policymaking over these
programs.
TABLE 2
RESCISSIONS AND DEFERRALS OF DEFENSE AND HUD PROGRAMS











(Source: Office of Management and Budget; Data Printed in the Federal Register)
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Percentages indicate the proportion of impoundments in that category, for that
period.
(Source: Office of Management and Budget; Data Printed in the Federal Register)
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Policy impoundment recommendations made by President Carter numbered 24
of 43 or 56 percent for defense programs. National defense impoundment
recommendations made during President Reagan's two terms totalled 39 of 89, or
44 percent. Cumulative totals for both Presidents show DOD policy
impoundment recommendations accounted for 63 of 132 impoundment actions, or
48 percent, significantly more than Congress anticipated.
The Department of Housing and Urban Development, because it serves a
different constituency, was selected to provide contrast to the Department of
Defense impoundments. Review of the HUD impoundment recommendations show
additional support for the idea that the President is inclined to use impoundment in
the interest of executive policymaking.
Table 4 shows the distribution of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development impoundment recommendations for fiscal years 1977 through 1988.^
This table was constructed in the same manner as Table 3. Policy impoundment
recommendations of HUD programs made by President Carter totalled three of
five, or 60 percent. It is not surprising President Carter used impoundment of
HUD appropriations so sparingly, given the constituency he served and the strong
support his political party held for HUD programs. President Reagan, on the other
hand, would be much more likely to make impoundment recommendations of HUD
2A review of the special messages concerning the statutory impoundment
recommendations made by President Reagan in 1982 stated that the President
wanted to retain budget alternatives while operating under the Continuing
Resolution (P.L. 97-51). Once Congress passed the Omnibus Appropriations Act
for fiscal year 1982, 0MB apportioned all these funds. Therefore, these
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Percentages indicate the proportion of impoundments in that category, for that
period.
(Source: Office of Management and Budget; Data Printed in the Federal Register)
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programs for policy reasons, given the reduced political support of his pany for
these programs. Not surprisingly then, of 54 HUD program impoundment
recommendations made by President Reagan, 37, or 69 percent, were for policy
reasons.
The number of impoundment recommendations made for policy reasons is one
legitimate measure of the extent the President uses impoundment control to alter
congressional policymaking through the appropriations process. Another method
used to determine this is to compare the relative dollar values of the impoundment
recommendations made for purposes of managerial efficiency or policy. Figure 1
shows the distribution of impoundment recommendation dollar values, efficiency
versus policy, for Department of Defense and defense related programs. In each of
the first seven years of the study period, policy impoundment recommendation
dollar values exceeded managerial efficiency impoundment recommendation dollar
values by at least a two to one margin. In 1983 for example, policy impoundment
recommendations involved over $2.6 billion compared to $454 million for
purposes of managerial efficiency, a margin of greater than five to one.
In 1984 policy impoundment recommendation dollar values of national defense
programs were below those for managerial efficiency for the first time during the
study period. Impoundment recommendations for national defense programs,
whether for efficiency or policy, remained very low, in dollar terms, during the
last five years of the study period. Policy impoundment recommendations for
national defense, measured in dollar terms, dropped so significantly in 1984
because the Reagan administration discontinued impoundment of the Shipbuilding
and Conversion, Navy appropriation. By 1983, impoundment of this account
reached a high of $2.4 Billion, or 91 percent of the policy impoundment dollars for
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STUDY YEARS
Figure 1. National Defense Impoundments in Current Dollars (Rounded to the
Nearest $Million)
By 1986 budget authority for national defense began to decline in terms of
constant dollars. President Reagan, a strong supporter of defense programs, was
apparently unwilling to challenge Congress on policy issues with respect to defense
program spending during periods of declining budget authority.
Table 5 shows the amount of budget authority for national defense programs in
current year dollars [Ref. 20:pp. 96-97]. Budget authority is used as the point of
reference in this table because impoundments are made in terms of budget
authority, not outlays. Constant dollar values are calculated by dividing curtent
dollars by the Gross National Product (GNP) deflator [Ref. 21 :p. 249] for that year.
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The percent change is determined by dividing constant dollar values in a given year
by the constant dollar value of the previous year.
TABLES
BUDGET AUTHORITY (BA), CURRENT AND CONSTANT DOLLARS,






























Constant dollar budget authority declined in 1986 by three percent. This
developed into a trend that continued in fiscal years 1987 and 1988, although the
decline was less severe during the latter years.
Department of Housing and Urban Development impoundment
recommendations in dollar terms support the argument that the dollar value of
policy recommendations exceeds the value of efficiency recommendations. Figure
2 shows the distribution of impoundment recommendation dollar values, efficiency
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Figure 2. Department of Housing and Urban Development Impoundments
(Rounded to the Nearest $Million)
During the period of the study, the President made impoundment
recommendations of HUD programs in nine of the twelve years. Policy
impoundment recommendation dollar values exceeded efficiency dollar values
seven of those nine years, usually by more than a ten to one ratio. In 1986 for
example, the dollar value of policy impoundment recommendations was in excess of
$13 billion.
Impoundment of appropriated funds can be classified into three general
categories: managerial efficiency, policy, and statutory. Reasons for making
impoundment recommendations are more specific. One such reason involves
impoundment as a tool to alter the federal budget submitted by the predecessor of
the newly elected President.
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D. IMPOUNDING PREDECESSOR BUDGETS
One of the first tasks facing a new President is to submit amendments to his
predecessor's budget to Congress, in an effort to convey a new set of policy and
programmatic priorities. When the new President assumes office, the fiscal year is
already in the second quarter. The process of submitting and justifying a
supplemental appropriations bill to establish revised spending priorities can be time
consuming. Impoundment could be used to alter the predecessor's budget in the
interim. One method to determine if impoundment is used to alter the
predecessor's budget is to review impoundment recommendations made by the new
President and compare these to impoundment recommendations made on the budget
in the final year of the previous administration. Table 6 shows the distribution of
impoundment recommendations made during the period of the study. This data was
gathered by reviewing cumulative summaries of rescissions and deferrals provided
by the Office of Management and Budget, printed in the Federal Register
throughout the period of the study.
Each time a new President has been elected, his impoundment recommendations
during the first year in office have exceeded recommendations made by his
predecessor the previous year. President Carter made 84 impoundment
recommendations during fiscal year 1977, his first year in office, compared to 72
made by President Ford the previous year. Though the numerical difference is
relatively small, the significance is increased when it is considered that Ford made
480 impoundment recommendations in less than three years in office compared to
only 378 made by Carter in four full years as President [Ref 18:p. 151]. In fiscal
year 1981 President Reagan made 293 impoundment recommendations, which is
more than two times as many as the 132 made by President Carter in 1980. The data
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indicates that the new President is likely to use impoundment to alter the federal
budget submitted by his predecessor in an effort to establish his revised list of
priorities.
TABLE 6







1976 20 52 72
1977 20 64 84
1978 20 66 86
1979 11 65 76
1980 59 73 132
1981 166 127 293
1982 31 248 279
1983 21 82 103
1984 9 65 74
1985 242 75 317
1986 83 70 153
1987 73 56 129
1988 34 34
(Source: Office of Management and Budget; Data Printed in the Federal Register)
E. IMPOUNDMEIVT OF THE ELECTION YEAR BUDGET
Another way the President's budget can be altered appears to happen as a
consequence of presidential elections. It is possible the President could expand the
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budget for the first fiscal year of the new term, in an effort to build political support
through proposed spending increases, with the knowledge he can make
impoundment recommendations to bring his budget back in line with his own
priorities after re-election. Table 7 shows the President's budget, in terms of
federal outlays, both current and constant dollars, along with the percent change
in constant dollars, and the number of impoundment recommendations made for
each year. Current and constant outlay figures were gathered from the Budget of
the United States Government, Historical Tables, FY 1989. Percent change was
calculated by dividing constant dollars for a given year by that value for the
previous year. Impoundment recommendations were taken from the total column
in Table 6.
President Caner submitted his 1981 federal budget, $726.5 billion in constant
dollars, or four percent growth over the previous year. This growth level was the
fourth highest of the study period. President Reagan submitted his 1985 budget,
$848 billion in constant dollars, or 7.6 percent growth over the previous year. The
rate of growth for 1985 was the highest during the study period. Additionally,
Reagan made 317 impoundment recommendations during fiscal year 1985, the most
either President made. President Carter was not re-elected in 1980. Therefore,
there is no data to support or reject the idea that he would have impounded a
significant portion of the four percent in real growth his 1981 budget submission
included. The data supports the idea that President Reagan inflated the 1985 budget
submission with the largest percent change of the study period and then
recommended 317 impoundments totalling $17.2 billion after his re-election.
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TABLE?
TOTAL OUTLAYS, ALL FEDERAL PROGRAMS, WITH PERCENT CHANGE
OF CONSTANT DOLLARS
CURRENT CONSTANT PERCENT IMPOUNDMENT
YEAR OUTLAYS OUTLAYS CHANGE RECOMMENDATIONS
1976 371.8 609.8 - 72
1977 409.2 622.6 +2.1% 84
1978 458.7 652.2 +4.8% 86
1979 503.5 660.2 +1.2% 76
1980 590.9 699.1 +5.9% 132
1981 678.2 726.5 +4.0% 293
1982 745.7 745.7 +2.6% 279
1983 808.3 774.6 +3.9% 103
1984 851.8 787.7 +1.7% 74
1985 946.3 848.0 +7.6% 317
1986 990.3 865.7 +2.1% 153
1987 1004.6 859.3 -0.7% 129
19881 1055.9 869.8 +1.2% 34
1 Estimate
(Source: Budget of the United States Government, Historical Tables, FY 1989)
Another use of presidential impoundment control involves increasing policy
impoundment recommendations to maintain spending priorities when faced with a
reduction of partisan political support in Congress. The next section will examine
the extent this changing cycle of partisan political support affects the use of
impoundment.
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F. PARTISAN POLITICS AND POLICY IMPOUNDMENTS
When the President's party loses influence by a reduction in the number of seats
held in Congress, he could increase the use of policy impoundments in an attempt to
maintain budget priorities. Table 8 shows the partisan political relationship
between the President and Congress from 1977 through 1988 [Ref. 22].
Percentages are calculated by dividing each party representation value by the sum of
the values for that House of Congress for that time period. These relationships are
best understood when examined in two year increments corresponding to the
Congress in session.
Comparison of these shifts in political support with changes in policy
impoundment levels will indicate the extent the President uses policy impoundments
to maintain his budget priorities. Figure 3 shows the changes in partisan political
support and the policy impoundment recommendations, in dollar terms, of national
defense programs. Both values are shown as a percentage. Percentages for partisan
political support are calculated by adding percent support of the President's political
party in the Senate and the House of Representatives and dividing by two.
Percentages for policy impoundment recommendations of defense programs are
calculated by dividing the dollar value of policy impoundments by the total value of
all impoundments for that two year period, taken from Table 3. If the trends move
in opposite directions, up or down, the indication is that the President increases
policy impoundments when partisan support in Congress is reduced.
When panisan political support for President Carter decreased in 1979, policy
impoundment recommendations of national defense programs increased. Partisan
support for President Reagan increased in 1985 and policy impoundments of
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national defense programs were reduced. When partisan political support went
down in 1987, policy impoundment recommendations of these programs increased.
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Figure 3. Changes in Partisan Political Support and its affect on National Defense
Policy Impoundments
The data supports the concept that the President is likely to use policy
impoundments to maintain budget priorities when faced with reduced partisan
political support in Congress. If the President will use policy impoundments to
maintain spending priorities of national defense programs when faced with reduced
political support in Congress, he could also use impoundment to alter regional
defense spending.
G. IMPOUNDMENT AND REGIONAL DEFENSE SPENDING
Defense spending is regional in nature. More than 50 percent of the defense
spending that is traceable to the states occurs in just seven states. Table 9 shows the
state ranking of defense spending in billions of dollars and as a percentage of total
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29. New Mexico 0.8
30. Utah 0.8


















































38. Arkansas 0.4 4.0%
39. North Dakota 0.3 8.8%
40. Nevada 0.3 4.8%
41. Iowa 0.3 1.9%
42. Vermont 0.2 7.7%
43. South Dakota 0.2 7.4%
44. Idaho 0.2 4.5%
45. Oregon 0.2 1.3%
46. Montana 0.1 2.7%
47. Wyoming 0.1 2.6%
48. West Virginia 0.1 1.0%
(Source: James, December 1987)
corporate income [Ref. 23 :p. 25]. The value for defense spending includes military
and civilian pa>Tolls and defense contracts for goods and senices greater than ten
thousand dollars. California, the state with the largest amount of defense spending,
receives 17.5 percent of the total. The second largest recipient of defense spending
is Texas, at just under nine percent. Virginia (7%), New York (6%), and Missouri,
Connecticm, and Florida, each with four percent, account for the remaining five of
the first seven states.
National defense spending is separated into seven subfunctions during the
budgeting and appropriations process. These subfunctions are:
1. Procurement. This includes acquisition of weapons, ammunition, parts,
equipment, and modification of existing equipment.
2. Operations and Maintenance (O&M). This includes costs of operating and
maintaining the armed forces.
3. Military Personnel (MILPERS). This includes the cost of providing armed
forces p)ersonnel.
4. Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E). This includes the
cost of modernization through development and testing.
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5. Department of Defense, Civil. This includes all the expenses of projects
carried out by the Corps of Engineers.
6. Military Construction (MILCON). This includes the costs of construction and
maintenance of military real property.
7. Department of Energy, Atomic Energy Defense Activities (AEDA). This
includes costs associated with defense atomic energy and weapons development
programs.
Presidential impoundment of national defense programs is categorizes into
these seven subfunctions to determine if impoundments, like defense spending, are
regional in nature. Table 10 shows the average annual appropriation of each of the
seven subfunctions along with the distribution of defense impoundment
recommendations across the subfunctions [Ref. 20:p. 96].
The average annual appropriation by subfunction is calculated by adding the
appropriated budget authority for each subfunction from 1977 through 1988 and
dividing by 12. The purpose of this is to show the relative size of the subfunction
in dollar terms. Each national defense impoundment was assigned to a subfunction
in the Special Message provided by the Office of Management and Budget.
Three of the subfunctions, procurement, milcon, and DoD-civil, combine to
include 116 or 88 percent of national defense impoundment recommendations.
Funding of these three subfunctions is also most traceable to individual states or
regions. Therefore, it would appear that presidential impoundments were likely to
be regionally applied. The Department of Defense civil subfunction was subjected
to 52 impoundment recommendations, none of which could be assigned specifically
to a region. Similarly, the military construction subfunction was subjected to 42
impoundments, but owing to the diverse nature of construction programs, none
could be assigned to a region. In the procurement subfunction, 10 of 22
impoundment recommendations were regional. Table 11 shows the states against
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which regional impoundment recommendations were made, the number of
impoundments, and the total dollar value of those impoundments.
TABLE 10















DOD, CIVIL $21,655 52
MILC0N2 $6,185 42
DOE, AEDA3 $5,064 11
Walues for 1988 are estimates.
^MTLCON includes Family Housing, DoD appropriations.
^Depanment of Energy, Atomic Energy Defense Activities.
Both of the California impoundments involve the Aircraft Procurement, Air
Force account, and the B-1 bomber aircraft production cancellation by President
Carter. The Virginia impoundment involves the Shipbuilding and Conversion,
Navy account, and cancellation of advanced procurement of a nuclear powered
aircraft carrier and modernization of a nuclear powered guided missile cruiser.
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TABLE 11






New York 1 116.0
Texas 1 65.7
(Source: The Office of Management and Budget, Printed in the Federal Register)
Four of the Washington impoundments involve the Missile Procurement, Air
Force account, with two each concerning the Minuteman III missile procurement
program and the short range attack missile program for the B-1 bomber aircraft.
The Fifth Washington impoundment involves the Shipbuilding and Conversion,
Navy account, and the PHM-1 class hydrofoil production program. The New York
impoundment involves the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy account, and
modernization of the FFG-7 class guided missile frigate fire control systems. The
Texas impoundment involves the Aircraft Procurement, Air Force account, and
reduction of the F-16 fighter aircraft production program.
These ten impoundment recommendations account for less than 17 percent, in
dollar terms, of national defense program impoundments, and less than eight
percent numerically. The data suggests that while defense spending is regional in
nature, impoundment recommendations do not appear regional.
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The study involved analysis of two h>potheses:
1. (HI) Impoundment has been used primarily as a tool of routine managerial
efficiency.
2. (H2) Impoundment has been used primarily as a tool to alter congressional
polic>Tnaking.
The first hypothesis received little support from the study. If impoundment had
been used primarily as a tool of managerial efficiency, it is expected a higher
percentage of the dollar value of impoundments would have been for this purpose.
Only eight percent of the dollar value of impoundments were efficiency in nature.
The study supports the hypothesis that impoundments have been used primarily for
purposes of policymaking. These impoundments represent 48 percent of the total
reviewed, and 92 percent of the total in dollar terms.
Defense analysts at the Office of Management (0MB) and Budget and the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) were asked to comment on the findings in this
thesis. A defense analyst in the Office of Budget Review at 0MB agreed that
rescissions and deferrals were made for reasons of policy as well as for efficiency.
During the discussion of the trends evaluated in this thesis, the analyst indicated that
each rescission or deferral is assessed on a case by case basis, and that the trends
developed are not correlative. [Ref 24] A defense analyst in the Budget Analysis
branch at CBO indicated that rescissions and deferrals were not evaluated in terms
of purpose or reason by his organization. He indicated that impoundments were
only evaluated in terms of proposed reductions in budget authority and the
consequences of those reductions on programs. [Ref. 25]
It should be considered that these comments are the opinions of the analysts and
are not necessarily the policy of the agencies they represent.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
During the past 12 years the President has used policy impoundment far more
than Congress anticipated when the Impoundment Control Act was passed in 1974.
Results of the analysis from the preceding chapter show that the President used
impoundment of national defense programs for policy reasons 48 percent of the
time from 1977 through 1988. The dollar value of those policy impoundments
exceeded efficiency impoundments by $7.7 billion and represented 81 percent of
impoundment recommendations of these programs alone.
Results of the examination of Department of Housing and Urban Development
impoundments, used to provide constituency contrast, support this finding. Policy
impoundments represented 67 percent of the total for HUD programs. The dollar
value of these policy impoundments exceeded efficiency impoundments by $26.3
billion and represented 95 percent, in dollar terms, of impoundment
recommendations for these programs.
This major use of policy impoundment is significant because one of the
principle purposes of the Impoundment Control Act is to restrict the primary use of
presidential impoundment to matters of managerial efficiency. Yet impoundment
recommendations appear to be more for purposes of policymaking than efficiency.
It is possible to evaluate the extent to which the President uses impoundment
for more specific reasons than simply policy versus efficiency. One such reason
is that the new President is likely to use impoundment to alter his predecessor's
budget in an effort to establish his own set of spending priorities.
The period of time between the new President's assumption of office and the
time required to secure supplemental appropriations legislation to accomplish the
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establishment of new spending priorities can be quite lengthy. Perhaps the Congress
is unwilling to alter the previously approved appropriations to the extent the new
President deems necessary. Impoundment is one method to alter the federal budget,
in a timely manner, to establish new spending priorities.
Each time a new President has been elected, the number of impoundment
recommendations made during the first year in office has exceeded those made by
his predecessor the previous year. President Carter made 14.1 percent more
impoundment recommendations than President Ford had during fiscal year 1976.
President Reagan made 221 percent more impoundment recommendations in fiscal
year 1981 than President Carter had in 1980. These increases demonstrate the
likelihood that the President will use impoundments to alter the predecessor's
budget when there are significant differences in spending priorities.
Another way impoundment is used as a federal budget altering technique
happens as a consequence of budget manipulation at presidential election time. The
President will inflate the federal budget submission for the first year of the new
term in an effon togain constituency support from the various special interests
this increased spending will effect. Once the President has been re-elected he
increases the use of impoundment in an attempt to adjust the federal budget to a level
more in keeping with his spending priorities. President Reagan inflated the 1985
federal budget submission with the largest percent change of his administration and
then recommended an unprecedented 317 impoundments totalling $17.2 billion
after his re-election.
This is an especially effective technique because partisan political support for
the re-elected President will likely increase in Congress due to the phenomena
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where legislators ride the President's "coattails" into office. This increases the
chance for successful impoundment of the inflated budget.
The issue of changing partisan political support can influence the use of
presidential impoundment in another way. When the President's party loses
influence by a reduction in the number of seats held in Congress, he increases the
use of policy impoundments to maintain established budget priorities. When
partisan political support for President Carter decreased in 1979, policy
impoundment recommendations of national defense programs increased, in dollar
terms, from 74 percent to 95 percent. Partisan support for President Reagan
increased in 1985 and policy impoundments for national defense programs
decreased from 78 percent to 24 percent. When partisan political support went
down in 1987, policy impoundment recommendations for these programs increased
from 24 percent to 60 percent.
The President will use policy impoundments to maintain spending priorities of
national defense programs when faced with reduced partisan political support in
Congress. Will he also use impoundment to alter regional defense spending?
Defense spending is regional. More than 50 percent of defense spending that is
traceable to the states occurs in just seven states. These include: California (17.5%),
Texas (8.9%), Virginia (7.0%), New York (5.8%), Missouri (4.3%), Connecticut
(4.0%), and Florida (3.9%).
The President has made 132 impoundment recommendations of national
defense programs during the period from fiscal year 1977 through 1988. Only ten
of these 132 impoundments can be classified as regional. All ten involve policy
impoundments of military procurement programs, and represent less than 17
percent of the dollar value of all defense impoundments during this period.
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Therefore, while defense spending is regional, impoundment of defense spending
does not appear regional.
The final analysis in this thesis reviews President Reagan's use of impoundment
of national defense programs. He has clearly been a pro-defense President with
respect to the defense budget, having increased defense spending in constant dollar
terms by 49 percent since 1980. Some may be surprised to learn that he has
impounded defense appropriations at all. In his eight years as President he made
89 impoundment recommendations of national defense programs with a total dollar
value of $7.4 billion. He has not attempted to cancel much defense spending;
rescissions recommended during his two terms total $336.5 million. Most of his
defense impoundment recommendations have been deferrals (totalling $7.1 billion)
usually made in an attempt to stretch out spending for reasons of efficiency. The
major portion of defense impoundment recommendations made by President
Reagan occurred in his first term, when the defense budget was growing at an
enormous rate. His use of impoundment supports the idea that impoundment is a
tool used by the President to manage his federal budget priorities. The national
defense budget appears to have been at or near the top of his priority list of spending
priorities.
In summary, Congress passed the Impoundment Control Act in an effort to
limit presidential policy impoundments. The Presidents have not succumbed to
congressional pressure to limit impoundment to matters of managerial efficiency.
Rather, they continue to make frequent policy impoundment recommendations in an
effort to maintain executive spending priorities.
The President will use impoundment to alter his predecessor's budget to
establish different spending priorities. He will inflate the federal budget submission
for the first year of the new term to gain special-interest support, then impound
that budget at increased levels upon re-election. When partisan political support in
Congress is reduced, he will increase policy impoundments to maintain spending
priorities.
Defense spending is regional in nature. Impoundment recommendations of
national defense programs do not appear regional.
President Reagan made impoundment recommendations of national defense
programs for many of the same reasons as his predecessors. He did not cancel much
defense spending because defense was a top priority in his administration.
Areas for possible future study include:
1. An analysis of the effectiveness of presidential impoundments. This could
include the relative success or failure of the individual impoundment
recommendations. Additionally, the effect of impoundment on the size of
future appropriations for impounded programs could be determined.
2. The extent to which the President has recommended impoundment of
congressional add-ons and plus-ups of the national defense budget. An add-on
is an appropriation that was not requested in the President's budget
submission. A plus-up refers to an increase to a department or agency
appropriation above the level requested in the President's budget. This would
test one of the ways impoundment resembles the proposed Hne item veto.
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